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vs.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
B R IE F  FOR APPELLANT.
TRACY L. JEFFORDS, 
EDWIN C. DUTTON,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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O c t o b e r  T e r m , 1922 .
No. 3870.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED PUB­
LIC ACCOUNTANTS, A CORPORATION, AP­
PELLANT,
vs.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Statement of Case.
The United States by its attorney for the District of 
Columbia filed under sec. 793 of the Code a bill against 
appellant, a corporation, under sec. 599 of the Code.
The bill alleged that appellant was holding itself 
out as empowered to issue degrees or certificates, with­
out any authority of law, in an utterly careless manner, 
and against the public policy of the District of Columbia.
The bill alleges appellant issued to an applicant in Vir­
ginia one of its certificates but does not allege anything 
wrong or unlawful about this.
The bill further alleges that certain persons in Cali­
fornia perpetrated a fraud on appellant by giving 
fictitious names and recommndations and appellant 
issued one of its certificates in the fictitious name of an 
applicant for same.
The bill alleges that appellant issued one of its certi­
ficates to a person in Kentucky, “in a manner derogatory 
to the public interests of the State of Kentucky.’’
8906— 1.
2On filing the bill, rule to show cause was issued and 
for return appellant moved to dismiss and was over­
ruled, and preliminary injunction was granted.
Appellant answered and moved to dissolve injunction, 
and appellee moved to strike out answer and for a decree 
pro confesso.
Court overruled motion to dissolve, made no decree 
pro confesso, but a final decree permanently enjoining 
appellant from making any use of its charter. Appellant 
duly excepted and appealed.
The provisions of the charter of appellant in exact 
words, permit it to do what it was doing, but notwith­
standing said charter provisions, appellee contends that 
appellant was doing what is “not by law allowed to be as­
sumed or exercised by said corporation.”
Sec. 575 of the Code in relation to incorporating—
“Institutions of Learning”
provides they are empowered to confer academical or 
honorary degrees such as are conferred by similar 
institutions.
Sec. 599 of the Code under which appellant is incorpor­
ated provides for incorporating—
“Societies, Benevolent, Educational and So Forth.”
First mentioned requires five incorporators, second re­
quires three, and appellant was incorporated with four.
ARGUMENT.
Appellee can maintain this action only under the pro­
visions in the Code authorizing the same which are either 
that appellant was doing something not allowed by its 
charter, or doing something not allowed by law, but the
3charter expressly provides that appellant may do exactly 
what it was doing, and therefore the only ground on 
which this action can be maintained is that appellant 
was doing something not allowed by law to be assumed 
or exercised by it (Code, D. C., 793).
The bill alleges that appellant was acting in an utterly 
careless manner, in a manner derogatory to the public 
interests of the State of Kentucky; against the public 
policy of the District of Columbia, and without au­
thority of law.
As a matter of fact, appellant had not done anything 
in an utterly careless manner, and what it had done, if 
done in that way, would not be a violation of law. This 
is not a law action for damages for negligence.
As a matter of fact appellant has not done anything 
in a manner derogatory to the public interests of the 
State of Kentucky, and as a matter of law it can not do 
anything in the District of Columbia in a manner deroga­
tory to the public interests of the State of Kentucky.
District of Columbia is created by Congress—“a gov­
ernment—a body corporate, for municipal purposes,” 
and it has no public policy in the ordinary acceptance 
and understanding of that expression, and none defined 
by any law or otherwise, and the bill makes no allega­
tion as to what such policy is, or how appellant has 
offended against it.
Degree as used by appellant is not an academic 
or honorary degree such as is conferred by institu­
tions of learning, and the attainments of a person 
expert in accounting do not entitle him to an academic or 
honorary degree such as are conferred by institutions of 
learning.
There are degrees of temperature, degrees in mathe­
matics, degrees of offenses, density, etc., etc., degrees of 
lodges, societies and organizations, but the distinctions
4between these and the degrees conferred by institutions 
of learning are well-known and well understood, and 
the only meaning or use of the word degree that has 
any place in this litigation is ac ad e m ic a l or h o n o ra ry , such 
as are conferred by institutions of learning.
Institutions of learning have been defined by our Court 
of Appeals as follows:
“ Those organizations of a permanent nature 
wherein the higher branches of education only are 
those in which instruction is given.”
U. S. ex rel. Chicago Business College vs.
Payne, 20 App. D. C., 606.
There are no allegations in the bill that appellant is 
such an institution as the Court of Appeals defines in its 
above cited definition, and there is no word of proof to 
show it to be such an institution and for that reason 
alone the decree from which appeal is taken herein should 
be reversed.
If there be nothing to show appellant within that 
definition there is nothing in this case on which to 
justify affirming the trial court.
So far as appellant has been able to learn no such 
institution confers the degree of certified public ac­
countant and the first use of the word degree in that con­
nection was made by appellant and it was and is a 
degree in name only, and not such as is contemplated 
by our local statute (Code, sec. 575).
Appellee contends that because appellant used the 
word degree in its certificate it was doing what can be 
done only by an institution of learning, and that being 
incorporated under section 599 and having but four in­
corporators it is not an institution of learning, and was 
violating the law.
5Articles of incorporation of appellant provide its 
purposes are:
“ To bring together in one common union 
certified public accountants who are now, or 
heretofore have been, engaged in the practice 
of professional accounting; also, those who, by 
virtue of education, personal endowments, tech­
nical training and experience are qualified to per­
form the duties pertaining to professional ac­
counting; to provide for the admission of mem­
bers, and when said members shall have pre­
sented satisfactory evidence of knowledge in 
the theory and practice of accounting, and 
shall have satisfactorily passed the prescribed 
qualifying examination of the association to 
admit said members to the degree of certi­
fied public accountant, and to issue to such 
members the Association’s formal certificate to 
that degree pertaining, to safeguard the rightful 
professional interests and promote the friendly, 
and social, and public relations of the members 
of this corporation; and to do all else incident, 
appurtenant, and germane to the purposes and 
objects of this corporation” (Rec., p. 8).
Body of certificate issued by appellant is as follows:
“ Be it known that______________________
having presented satisfactory evidence as to his 
knowledge of the Theory, Science, and Practice of 
Accountancy, or having passed the prescribed 
examination is hereby admitted to Membership 
in this Association, and upon him is conferred 
the Degree of Certified Public Accountant and 
as such is entitled to all the honors, rights, and 
privileges to that Degree appertaining (Rec., p. 
15).
Contention of appellee was adopted by the court, 
and appellant’s answer was struck out on the theory 
that so long as appellant admitted being incorporated 
under Section 599, it could not have any defense in
6this case, and therefore decree should be rendered against 
it as by default, but neither court or counsel have 
suggested under what law or practice it is permissible 
to strike out an answer as in this case was done.
The court has decreed against the appellant on the 
theory that the word degree as used by appellant con­
stituted a violation of law in contemplation of the 
following mentioned considerations:
(a) The court, without any testimony, found as a 
fact that appellant conferred the degree of certified 
public accountant in its certificate of membership.
(b) That the degree of certified public accountant is 
an academic or honorary degree such as are conferred 
by institutions of learning.
(c) That appellant is not an institution of learning.
On these findings of fact, without any testimony, the
court held as a matter of law, that appellant was doing 
what is "not by law allowed to be assumed or exercised 
by said corporation.”
“ Degree” is any academic rank recognized by colleges 
and universities having a reputable character as institu­
tions of learning, or any form of expression composed in 
whole or in part of words recognized as indicative of 
academic rank, alone or in combination with other 
words, so that there is conveyed to the ordinary mind 
the idea of some collegiate or university or scholastic 
distinction.
Commonwealth vs. New England College of 
Chiropractic, 221 Mass., 190.
In this chiropractic case, discussing degrees, the 
Massachusetts court say, that if the evidence was 
believed, it warranted a finding by the jury that doctor 
of chiropractic was treated as a degree, but the testimony 
in the case showed it was conferred similar to the
7conferring of degrees by colleges or universities at 
commencement.
And further: “ There are three general grades of such 
degrees: namely, Bachelor, Master, Doctor.”
And further degree “ signifies an academic dis­
tinction,” and includes whatever p ro p e rly  may be 
described  as a degree.
What is a degree depends on what is described as 
such, and depends on facts and circumstances on 
proof of how the word is sued, by whom, and under 
what circumstances.
No authority has been suggested as a basis for sus­
taining the contention of appellee and the decree of 
the court.
If the court passed upon the whole case its decree 
was so apparently an error that there is no need of 
argument to show that, but having struck out the 
answer there is left no room for it to be considered as 
sufficient or not sufficient to answer or swear away the 
allegations of the bill and entitle appellant to be heard on 
the merits of the case.
And all that is beside the question and unnecessary 
to be considered, if this court takes the view of the 
case which appellee and the trial court took of it, that 
no matter what the pleadings may show as to what 
was done, or was not done, or when, or where, or how 
anything was done by appellent, the sole question is 
as to the use by appellant of the word degree, and 
that same may be rightly determined in this case as a 
matter of law, without testimony as to facts and cir­
cumstances of the case, and without giving appellant 
its day in court to show the facts.
Before this court should affirm the trial court it 
must go further and hold that the trial court was right 
as to procedure in doing what it has done, and right in its 
decision as to the use of the word degree by appellant
8and that it was doing what is “ not by law allowed to be 
assumed or exercised by said corporation.”
It must be conceded that appellant, by issuing certifi­
cates in the form they were issued, was not exercising 
any franchise, liberty or privilege or transacting any 
business not allowed by its charter or certificate of in­
corporation, for the record shows that the certificate of 
incorporation expressly gave it the privilege of issuing 
its certificates in the exact words in which they were 
issued, and such form is here complained about by the 
United States through the District Attorney. This certi­
ficate of incorporation is a contract between the United 
States and the corporation, and in issuing its certificates 
in the manner and form in which they were issued the 
corporation was doing exactly that which by virtue of its 
contract with the United States it had the right to do.
This narrows the controversy to the only other provi­
sion of Section 793 of our Code under which this action 
might be maintained, that is to say, that appellant is 
exercising a franchise, liberty or privilege or transacting 
business not by law allowed to be assumed or exercised 
by said corporation. What is the franchise, liberty, privi­
lege or business being done by this corporation which is 
not by law allowed to be done? This seems to us to be the 
only question involved in this cause. The real complaint 
alleged in the bill is that appellant is issuing degrees, 
which, while allowed by the contract between the United 
States and appellant, are yet not allowed by law because 
only institutions of learning can issue degrees, and appel­
lant is not an institution of learning. We say that the 
word degree as used in the certificates issued by appellant 
is not such a degree as comes within the provisions of 
Section 575 of the Code, and is neither academical or 
honorary, and that the form of certificate is therefore 
legal and proper and that appellant has a legal right to 
issue certificates in the form in which they were being
9issued and in so doing controverts no law of the District 
of Columbia.
Appellant contends that whether or not this use of the 
word degree constituted a violation of law, whether or 
not appellant is an institution of learning, whether or 
not the use of this word degree in the certificates of 
appellant constitutes conferring an academical or honor­
ary degree such as are conferred by institutions of 
learning all depend on facts and circumstances, and that 
appellant had a right to be heard as to same.
Appellant further contends that striking out the an­
swer and passing final decree as was done in this case is 
without authority or justification in law or equity, or 
good conscience.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court should 
be reversed.
TRACY L. JEFFORDS, 
EDWIN C. DUTTON,
A tto rn ey s f o r  A p p e lla n t.
